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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, the Macondo oil well ruptured during the 
final phases of exploratory drilling.1 Methane gas and other 
substances spewed from the well onto the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
platform causing an explosion and fire that killed eleven crewmen2 
 
  Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Special thanks to Byron Talmadge 
Infinger IV and Max Sills for valuable research assistance and to Mark Cohen, Andy Daughety, 
Jennifer Reinganum, and participants at the Rigs, Risk, and Responsibility: Conference on the 
BP Oil Spill at Vanderbilt University Law School for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. See Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html?ref=gulfofmexico2010. 
 2. See Ed Crooks & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Cultural Failings Leave BP Engulfed, FIN. 
TIMES, June 8, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dea66a94-7327-11df-ae73-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz1RwGN4Dnd.; Noaki Schwartz & Harry R. Weber, Methane Gas Bubble Triggered Deadly 
Oil Rig Explosion, Workers Say, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), May 8, 2010, 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20100508/ARTICLE/5081048/2416. 
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and ultimately sank the platform.3 Over the next three months, the 
well, located approximately 250 miles southeast of Houston, Texas,4 
spilled as much as 184 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.5 
In the aftermath, the U.S. government banned deepwater drilling for 
several months6 while applicable regulations were toughened.7 
The well’s majority owner was BP PLC, formerly known as the 
British Petroleum Company.8 Since the spill, BP has paid out as much 
as $60 billion in cleanup costs and in reimbursements for the lost 
livelihoods of people and companies on the Gulf Coast.9 In addition, 
BP’s stock price plummeted to a fourteen-year low—slashing the 
company’s pre-crisis market value by half.10 Public opinion of BP11 and 
employee morale also plummeted, the latter creating a risk that many 
 
 3. See Jessica Resnick-Ault & Katarzyna Klimasinka, Transocean Rig Sinks in Gulf of 
Mexico as Coast Guard Looks for Survivor, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-22/transocean-rig-sinks-in-gulf-of-mexico-following-blaze-coast-
guard-says.html. 
 4. See Rowena Mason, BP's 35,000ft Well Could Produce 3bn Barrels of Oil, TELEGRAPH 
(London), Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/6128323/BPs-
35000ft-well-could-produce-3bn-barrels-of-oil.html. 
 5. See Vivienne Walt, Can BP Ever Rebuild Its Reputation?, TIME, July 19, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2004701,00.html.  
 6. See Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe, Six-
Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 30, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/ 
news/pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-Six-Month-Moratorium-onDeepwater 
-Drilling.cfm. 
 7. See Nicholas Johnston & Hans Nichols, New Offshore Oil Drilling Must Have 
Safeguards, Obama Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
04-30/new-offshore-oil-drilling-must-have-safeguards-obama-says.html. For example, oil 
companies now must prove their ability to contain oil spills occurring in deep water before being 
granted new drilling permits. Marian Wang, First Deepwater Drilling Permit Since BP Spill Goes 
to . . . a Well Co-Owned by BP, PROPUBLICA BLOG (Mar. 1, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://www.propublica 
.org/blog/item/first-deepwater-drilling-permit-since-bp-spill-goes-to-a-well-co-owned-by-b. 
 8. Marie Neptune & Jay Ruskin, One-fourth Owner of Macondo Well ‘Shocked’ at BP’s 
‘Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct,’ UNITED FOR PEACE OF PIERCE COUNTY (June 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/9744-news-one-fourth-owner-
of-macondo-well-shocked-at-bps-gross-negligence-or-willful-misconduct.html. 
 9. See Walt, supra note 5; see also GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 19, available at  http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_ 
pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf (noting that the compensation fund, paid into by BP, will cover 
claims for lost earnings and lost profits). 
 10. See Ayesha Rascoe & Tom Doggett, BP Shares Plunge as U.S. Threatens New Penalties, 
REUTERS, June 9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/us-oil-spill-
idUSTRE6573FD20100609. 
 11. Mark Murray, Poll: Spill Drags the President’s Ratings Down, MSNBC.COM, June 23, 
2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37881749 (providing results of June 2010 NBC News 
Journal poll, where respondents gave BP only a 6% favorable rating, compared historically to a 
3% favorable rating given to Saddam Hussein and an 11% favorable rating for O.J. Simpson). 
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employees would seek jobs elsewhere.12 In addition to the drilling ban, 
Congress appropriated several million dollars to increase federal 
inspection and monitoring of drilling operations.13 In its most recent 
annual report, BP states that it may face additional U.S. regulations 
that would increase its costs of regulatory compliance and decrease its 
ability to pursue new exploration.14 That report also identifies 
reputational damage making it more difficult for BP to secure 
investment opportunities from other governments.15 Thus, as a result 
of this explosion, BP has incurred substantial liabilities, has 
diminished its human capital, and has increased its regulatory 
burdens. 
This Article argues that BP could have prevented some portion 
of these losses through more effective public relations (“PR”). In 
particular, despite remarkable efforts to express regret and to take 
full responsibility for the damage caused by the rupture and spill, BP 
created the impression that its statements were insincere through a 
series of public images and comments that dampened and 
counteracted the effectiveness of its apologies. Recent experimental 
studies show that we ascribe more positive behaviors and motives to 
ingroup members than to outgroup members. This Article posits that 
BP harmed itself through its public appearances and statements by 
enhancing the degree to which members of the public viewed the 
company as outside their socioeconomic and national group (as well as 
the group of individuals and organizations that share their basic 
values). BP’s situation suggests that the effect of ingroup and 
outgroup triggers on apology, liability, and regulation warrants more 
study. 
Part II identifies an evolutionary approach to apology.16 
Conciliatory efforts can be seen as a way to economize punishment 
 
 12. See Graham Hales, The BP Brand One Year Later: Branding Lessons From the Disaster, 
INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/Libraries/Articles/BP_One_Year_On_2 
.sflb.ashx (last visited July 15, 2011); Eve Tahmincioglu, Surviving Your Company’s Mistakes: 
Corporate Crises Such as BP, Toyota and elsewhere Impact Employees, MSNBC.COM, May 17, 
2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37108260/ns/business-personal_finance/t/surviving-your-
companys-mistakes/; BP Reviews, GLASSDOOR.COM, http://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/BP-
Reviews-E9011.htm (anonymous employee post on August 31, 2011 stating that employee morale 
remains low after oil spill). 
 13. See Michael R. Bromwich, Criticizing the Inspectors, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010, 
4:54 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/03/criticizing-inspectors. 
 14. BP P.L.C., ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 20-F 2010, at 29 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/sustainability/how_we_o
perate/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/AR_Form20F_Risks.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
 16. I’ve written on this topic before. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What 
Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 
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costs in the face of defection. Viewing apology from an evolutionary 
perspective generates insight into many apology practices, including 
the very careful scrutiny of apologies, the similarities in audience 
reception between individual and organizational apologies, the 
consequent advantage that organizations can garner when proffering 
apologies, and the role that ingroup and outgroup biases can play in 
the success or failure of apologies.  
Part III turns to BP’s public relations statements and situates 
these communications in apology discourse, including the acceptance 
of responsibility, expression of remorse, and offer of repair. This Part 
then contrasts BP’s executive conduct with Exxon’s executive conduct 
following the Exxon Valdez oil-tanker spill to show that, although BP 
avoided some of the Exxon executives’ PR mistakes, BP made other 
costly mistakes. In addition to providing PR lessons for the future, 
BP’s mistakes suggest fruitful avenues for further research regarding 
apologies and their connection to liability and regulation. Part IV 
concludes. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF APOLOGY 
A. Punishing Cheaters, to a Point 
Humans are a social species. Throughout our history, we’ve 
banded together in groups to hunt, to repel predators, to raise 
families, and to brave inhospitable climates. Indeed, there is no 
evidence that humans ever lived in isolation.17 Over time, small, 
mostly kin-based groups expanded into vast numbers of overlapping, 
sometimes large cooperative networks that include nonkin and even 
strangers. Often this cooperative behavior involves an individual 
conferring a benefit on another at some cost to herself with no 
expectation of an immediate return benefit. Evolutionary theorists 
refer to this phenomenon as reciprocal altruism.18 
Because return cooperation comes later, a noncooperator can 
exploit a cooperative network by joining it for long enough to reap 
benefits but not actually providing return benefits to the group. John 
Maynard Smith and George Price illustrated this problem with their 
 
(2004); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 
(2002). 
 17. Group living is a feature common to most primates. William A. Mason & Sally P. 
Mendoza, Primate Social Conflict: An Overview of Sources, Forms and Consequences, in PRIMATE 
SOCIAL CONFLICT 1, 1 (William A. Mason & Sally P. Mendoza eds., 1993). 
 18. Robert Trivers is credited with coining the term in Robert Trivers, The Evolution of 
Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35 (1971). 
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Hawk-Dove Game. In the game, individuals in a population are either 
Doves, who are passive cooperators, or Hawks, who are aggressive 
noncooperators. As the game plays out over time, Hawks exploit Doves 
and eventually drive them out of the population. The best strategy for 
a Dove is to act like a Dove when encountering other Doves but to act 
like a Hawk when encountering Hawks.19 
Robert Axelrod’s well-known computer tournament, which 
tested the relative success of strategies submitted by academics from a 
variety of disciplines for use in an iterated two-player Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game, bore out a similar lesson. The most successful 
strategy, submitted by a psychologist, was “tit-for-tat,” defined as 
cooperating in the first round and then mirroring the other player’s 
behavior in the previous round. Thus, if the other player cooperated in 
the previous round, the tit-for-tat strategy returned cooperation with 
cooperation. If instead the other player defected in the previous round, 
tit-for-tat returned defection with defection.20 Axelrod attributed tit-
for-tat’s success to its robust combination of niceness, retaliation, 
forgiveness, and clarity: “Its niceness prevents it from getting into 
unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from 
persisting whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore 
mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other 
player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.”21 
Successful social interactions tend to mirror these basic 
features. In Prisoner’s Dilemma situations, game theory often focuses 
on detecting and punishing defection by the other player. In their 
simplest form, optimal strategies set the punishment costs high 
enough to deter defections, factoring in the probability of actually 
detecting a defection. In real life, however, defections can occur 
regardless of the threatened sanctions. People fail to abide by 
cooperative norms for many reasons, including some combination of 
oversight, accident, misunderstanding, cruelty, laziness, selfishness, 
or indifference.22 Maximal punishment is often not the best response 
to transgression; after all, it is costly to the punisher, it is not 
warranted in all situations where others fail to comply with 
cooperative norms, and it inevitably fails to deter some nonpurposeful 
transgressions. Threatened punishment, including social ostracism, 
reputational damage, and liability, best deters failure to comply with 
 
 19. See J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 15 
(1973) (describing a more detailed variant of the Hawk-Dove Game); see also J. Maynard Smith, 
Optimization Theory in Evolution, 9 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 31, 48–52 (1978). 
 20. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 30–31 (1984). 
 21. Id. at 54. 
 22. O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1156. 
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cooperative norms. But in reality, punishment costs are conserved and 
future cooperation is enhanced by allowing a reduction or cessation of 
at least some punishment forms when the transgressor credibly 
pledges future compliance with the cooperative norms. The optimal 
strategy, like tit-for-tat, is retaliatory and yet discriminately forgiving. 
B. The Value of Apology (and Other Reparative Discourse) 
Humans often de-escalate conflicts with conciliatory gestures, 
and evidence indicates that other highly evolved social species also use 
conciliatory gestures.23 For example, consider noted ethologist Frans 
de Waal’s description of conflict resolution among chimpanzees: 
I first realized that this subject can be studied in other species after witnessing a fight 
in the chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands. It was the winter of 
1975 and the colony was kept indoors. In the course of a charging display, the dominant 
male attacked a female, which caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees came to 
her defense. When the group finally calmed down, an unusual silence followed, with 
nobody moving, as if the apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony 
burst out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the corner of the 
hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two chimpanzees kiss and embrace. 
. . . [T]he embracing individuals had been the same male and female of the initial fight. 
When the word ‘reconciliation’ popped into my mind, it immediately illuminated the 
connection. From that day on I noticed that emotional reunions between aggressors and 
victims were quite common. The phenomenon became so obvious that it was hard to 
imagine that it had been overlooked for so long by me and by scores of other 
ethologists.24 
There is no doubt that culture significantly shapes 
reconciliation behaviors,25 but de Waal argues the phenomenon’s roots 
go much deeper: 
 
 23. See generally Frans de Waal, Reconciliation Among Primates: A Review of Empirical 
Evidence and Theoretical Issues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 111 (arguing 
that increased contact and appeasing behavior in primates after conflict suggests social 
reconciliation); Frans B.M. de Waal & RenMei Ren, Comparison of the Reconciliation Behavior of 
Stumptail and Rhesus Macaques, 78 ETHOLOGY 129, 130–31 (1988) (describing reconciliation 
studies of several primate species); Frans B.M. de Waal & Angeline van Roosmalen, 
Reconciliation and Consolation Among Chimpanzees, 5 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 55, 55 
(1979) (discussing postconflict reconciliation behavior among chimpanzees); Frans B.M. de Waal 
& Deborah Yoshihara, Reconciliation and Redirected Affection in Rhesus Monkeys, 85 
BEHAVIOUR 224, 239–40 (1983) (summarizing an empirical study of chimpanzee conciliatory 
behavior); Karolina Westlun et al., Post-Conflict Affiliation in Common Marmosets, 52 AM. J. 
PRIMATOLOGY 31, 44 (2000) (explaining reconciliation through postconflict affiliation in 
marmosets); Allison D. York & T.E. Rowell, Reconciliation Following Aggression in Patas 
Monkeys, Erythrocebus Patas, 36 ANIMAL BEHAV. 502, 507–08 (1988) (comparing reconciliation 
in patas monkeys with that of other primates). 
 24. FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 5 (1989). 
 25. See, e.g., Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-
Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 283, 283 (1986) (conducting a cross cultural study of apology); 
Michael C. Luebbert, The Survival Value of Forgiveness, in EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE 169, 185 
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Forgiveness is not, as some people seem to believe, a mysterious and sublime idea that 
we owe to a few millennia of Judeo-Christianity. It did not originate in the minds of 
people . . . . The fact that monkeys, apes, and humans all engage in reconciliation 
behavior means that it is probably over thirty million years old. . . . [R]econciliation 
behavior must be seen as a shared heritage of the primate order. Our species has many 
conciliatory gestures and contact patterns in common with the apes (stretching out a 
hand, smiling, kissing, embracing, and so on). . . . Language and culture merely add a 
degree of subtlety and variation to human peacemaking strategies.26 
Reconciliation among both humans and other primates often 
involves one party to the conflict placing itself in a position of clear 
powerlessness relative to the other27 and performing an act that 
represents a plea for future conflict to subside.28 Among humans, such 
gestures often take the form of apology. 
When effective, apologies can almost instantaneously erode the 
anger and pain associated with transgressions. While there is 
disagreement among sociologists, psychologists, moral philosophers, 
and others regarding the elements of effective apologies (those likely 
to elicit reconciliation), four features seem to be either express or 
implied in most effective apologies: the identification of a wrongful 
act,29 an expression of remorse,30 a promise to forbear future 
transgressions,31 and an offer to repair the damage in some way.32 
 
(David H. Rosen & Michael C. Luebbert eds., 1999) (arguing that the concept of forgiveness can 
have different meanings in shame and guilt-based cultures); Harry C. Triandis, Individualism 
and Collectivism: Past, Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 35, 39 
(David Matsumoto ed., 2001) (arguing that apologies and the language of reconciliation differ 
depending on whether a culture is individualist or collectivist); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur 
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & 
SOC'Y REV. 461, 461 (1986) (comparing apology in Japan and the United States). 
 26. DE WAAL, supra note 24, at 270–71. 
 27. See NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 
35 (1991) (discussing the power of the victim in the aftermath of apology in that “the victim alone 
holds the keys of redemption and reconciliation”); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 28 (1988) (discussing the moral ritual of apology where a transgressor 
lowers himself to beg for forgiveness). 
 28. De Waal, for example, offers a drawing reproducing a scene where a transgressor gets 
too close to a mother’s infant, causing the mother to hit her. The transgressor initially retreats to 
safety but then returns to the mother and places her face very close to the mother while yelping. 
The mother could have attacked again but instead plants a kiss on the nose of the transgressor. 
Frans B.M. de Waal, The First Kiss: Foundations of Conflict Resolution Research in Animals, in 
NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15, 18 fig.2.1 (Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 2000). 
 29. See O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1133–34 (discussing examples of unsuccessful 
apologies due to the transgressor’s reluctance to make clear the nature of his wrong). 
 30. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1014–15 
(1999) (expression of regret essential element of apology); Deborah Tannen, I’m Sorry, I Won’t 
Apologize, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 1996, at 34 (providing advice for effective apologies and 
stating that “the depth of remorse should be commensurate with the significance of the offense”). 
 31. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 25, at 469. 
 32. Id. For a fuller discussion of these elements and the interdisciplinary literature on 
apology, see O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1131–39. 
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These elements serve many functions; the first three elements 
together confirm the validity of a shared norm of cooperation.33 
Despite the transgression, everyone agrees that the offending behavior 
was unsatisfactory. The transgressor’s offer of repair shows that the 
transgressor wishes to relieve the victim of at least some of the harm 
that the victim suffered. 
Effective apologies can reopen the door to future mutually 
beneficial exchanges. They can also relieve the transgressor of some of 
the liability associated with the transgression. For example, victims 
who participate in victim-offender mediation (“VOM”) often receive a 
heartfelt apology from their offenders,34 and, as a result, many are 
better able to let go of hate and anger.35 VOM is a growing substitute 
for the criminal justice system and is used primarily for low-level 
property crimes committed by first-time (often juvenile) offenders.36 In 
VOM, victims and offenders meet in the presence of a mediator to 
discuss the crime and its impact on the victim, and, if the victim 
wishes, the charges can be dropped after the completion of VOM. 
About eighty to ninety percent of participants report high levels of 
satisfaction with VOM,37 and the apology often proves more valuable 
to the victim than either punishment or compensation.38 
In the context of civil law, apology can help to both settle the 
dispute and reduce the ultimate amount of liability. In a survey of 
members of the State Bar of Georgia conducted by Douglas Yarn, 
eighty-three percent of responding lawyers agreed that apology alone 
 
 33. Cf. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 14 (apologies “commemorate and reproduce ethical 
axioms”). 
 34. See Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria May Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both 
Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204–05 (2009) (noting that victims 
participate in VOM in part to receive an apology and offenders participate in part to proffer one). 
 35. MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & PEACEMAKING, VICTIM-
OFFENDER DIALOGUE IN CRIMES AND SEVERE VIOLENCE, A MULTI-SITE STUDY OF PROGRAMS IN 
TEXAS AND OHIO 13 (2002), available at http://www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/rjp/resources/ 
rj_dialogue_resources/VSOD_Severe_Violence/Exec_Sum_TX_OH_VOD_CSV.pdf. 
 36. O’Hara & Robbins, supra note 34, at 203 (citing studies). 
 37. Mark S. Umbreit et al., The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: Two Decades of 
Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 30 (2001). 
 38. See O’Hara & Robbins, supra note 34, at 211 (“Victims often walk into mediation hoping 
to force the offender to accept a punishment. They very often also present demands for 
reparations. At the end of the VOM process, however, what victims really value is the apology, 
the expression of remorse, and the understanding that only the VOM process could have 
provided them.”); see also Kimberly N. Grant, Ten Dollars for Twenty-Four Years, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Fall 2008, at 19, 21 (“Overall, victim-offender mediation holds promise to restore justice at 
a much deeper level than even the most generous compensation from the state.”). 
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could settle many disputes.39 In an experiment conducted by Russell 
Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, tenants were more likely to accept a 
settlement offer from their landlord when it was accompanied by an 
apology.40 Jennifer Robbennolt also conducted experiments where she 
asked subjects to imagine that they had been hurt in an accident and 
then report on their willingness to accept a settlement offer that 
covered their out-of-pocket expenses but no more. She found that 
subjects were more willing to accept the settlement offer when they 
were told that the transgressor had apologized for causing the harm.41 
Additionally, several hospitals that have recently adopted policies in 
which they disclose medical errors and apologize to patients following 
such incidents report significantly reduced litigation and liability 
costs.42 
Although apology can be a very useful tool for reducing 
hostilities, economizing on punishment costs, and promoting future 
cooperation, it can also be exploited by Hawk defectors who feign a 
commitment to Dove-like cooperation. As Ambrose Bierce once 
cynically quipped, apology can “lay the foundation for a future 
offense.”43 For apology to serve as a valuable reconciliation device, 
then, victims need some ability to discriminate between sincere and 
insincere apologies.44 In general, humans are surprisingly good at 
detecting cheating behavior in others.45 In fact, studies indicate that 
 
 39. See O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1125 n.14 (citing Douglas Yarn, Survey of 
Lawyers’ Attitudes Toward ADR, conducted on behalf of the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
Commissions on Dispute Resolution and Professionalism (on file with author)). 
 40. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An 
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 148 (1994). 
 41. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 482–89 (2003). Robbennolt also found that “partial” apologies (those in 
which the transgressor was guarded and failed to identify the wrongful act) sometimes reduced 
the subjects’ willingness to settle relative to subjects who were given no apology information. Id. 
at 486. 
 42. See, e.g., Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? 
The University of Michigan Experience, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Jan. 2009, at 125, 142–44 
(University of Michigan Health System’s litigation costs dropped by half after instating an open 
and honest response to patient complaints, which frequently included an apology); Jonathan R. 
Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Malpractice, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1451–54, 1457 (2000) (a VA hospital in Kentucky experienced lower 
costs after instituting policy of following up with patients and apologizing after discovering an 
error). 
 43. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 7 (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 12 
(1958)). 
 44. See O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1160 (“Generous forgivers who can discern sincere 
from insincere apologies have an advantage over both uniformly generous and stingy forgivers.”). 
 45. Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How 
Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187, 196–97, 259–60 
(1989).  
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lay people can detect deception at rates significantly higher than those 
attributable to chance.46  
The absence of one or more of the elements of an effective 
apology often indicates such a lack of sincerity. Consider, for example, 
Senator Bob Packwood’s apology made after several women accused 
him of sexual harassment during his time in office: “I’m apologizing 
for the conduct that it was alleged I did.”47 By failing to identify a 
specific wrongful act, Packwood failed to take ownership of any 
wrongful action, and his apology therefore seemed strategic.48 
Consider also Reverend Jerry Falwell’s apology after receiving 
criticism for stating that the Antichrist was alive and was a Jewish 
man. Although he apologized for his lack of “tact” and “judgment,” 
Falwell stated, “I apologize not for what I believe.”49 Falwell was 
sincere in his statements. Indeed, he might have believed he was 
acting out of integrity when he refused to suggest that he believed 
otherwise. But he did not appear to seek forgiveness for violating a 
shared sense of values or cooperative norms. Instead, Falwell seemed 
 
 46. Bella DePaulo et al., Humans as Lie Detectors, J. COMM., Spring 1980, at 129, 130. See 
generally Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced Memory for Faces of Cheaters, 17 ETHOLOGY & 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 119 (1996) (experimental results showing greater attention to and memory 
storage for people’s faces when accompanied by information that the people have a history of 
cheating); Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, in 14 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1981) (arguing that 
evolution selects for lie detection and describing lie-detection behavior). 
 47. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead, Say You’re Sorry, 28 PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 40, 
76, 78. 
 48. Id. It is not entirely clear just how specific a transgressor needs to be, however, and the 
answer may turn on the context. As a contrast to the Packwood statements, consider those of 
then gubernatorial candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger in response to allegations that he had 
engaged in sexual harassment:  
So I want to say to you, yes, that I have behaved badly sometimes. Yes, it is true that I 
was on rowdy movie sets and I have done things that were not right which I thought 
then was playful but now I recognize that I have offended people. And to those people 
that I have offended, I want to say to them I am deeply sorry about that and I apologize 
because this is not what I'm trying to do. When I'm governor, I want to prove to the 
women that I will be a champion for the women, a champion for the women. And I hope 
that you will give me the chance to prove that.  
Text of Arnold Schwarzenegger Apology, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2003, http://www.usa 
today.com/news/politicselections/state/2003-10-02-arnold-text_x.htm. This apology does not 
identify a specific person or date or even specific acts, yet it did not stop Californians from 
electing Schwarzenegger. Although this apology is slightly more specific than Packwood’s was, 
the difference might be that Packwood was accused of sexual harassment while serving in public 
office, whereas Schwarzenegger was accused of sexual harassment in Hollywood. Presumably, an 
effective public apology is more essential in cases where the wrongdoing occurred while serving 
in a job paid for with taxpayer dollars. 
 49. See National News Briefs, Falwell Apologizes for Antichrist Comment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
3, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/03/us/national-news-briefs-falwell-apologizes-for-anti 
christ-comment.html. 
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to insist that the community respect his beliefs even though many 
people found them insulting. In this sense, Falwell appeared to seek 
forgiveness without expressing remorse for the offense. To the extent 
that Falwell sought to resurrect the respect of those offended by his 
beliefs, his apology failed due to its insincere or strategic nature. 
In addition, sometimes apologies fail to express remorse 
effectively because they include argumentative language. When a 
spouse says, “I’m sorry that I didn’t mow the lawn, but I wanted to 
watch the game,” for example, it seems that the transgressor is not 
remorseful for failing to mow the lawn. Instead, it appears that the 
spouse is attempting to justify the course of conduct as reasonable. 
People rarely perceive the phrase “I’m sorry but . . .” as sincere.50 
People also tend to scrutinize apologies for more subtle 
indicators of sincerity. Context is important when determining the 
requisite timing, form, elaborateness, and word choice for an effective 
apology as recipients of apologies often scrutinize these for 
appropriateness. Nonverbal cues are also scrutinized, including eye 
contact, breathing, body posture, facial complexion, facial expressions, 
tone of voice, and pace of speech.51 Even small children focus on cues 
that indicate sincere remorse and are more likely to accept apologies 
when they think that the transgressor is remorseful.52 
With our apologies, we may hope to resurrect our reputations 
and thereby avoid ostracism or other punishment. Apologies can risk 
producing the opposite result, though, revealing damning information 
about the transgressor and leading to further reputational loss and 
ostracism. Truly effective apologies appear to transcend these 
functional concerns, however, because their nuances (timing, word 
choice, complexion, body language, and the like) suggest that 
emotional forces (like guilt and an honest desire to fix the problem) 
compel them. In his well-known book, Passions Within Reason, Robert 
Frank discusses the importance of such cues for interpreting the 
 
 50. See Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1173 
(1997) (discussing the use of explanation apologies); Amy J. Stephson, Law Means Never Having 
To Say You’re Sorry . . . Or Does It?, KING COUNTY B. BULL. (July 2011), 
http://www.amystephson.com/docs/KCBA_Jul2011_AmyStephson.pdf (describing “I’m sorry, but I 
…” apologies as bad apologies). 
 51. O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1139–40; see Robert N. Strassfield, Robert McNamara 
and the Art and Law of Confession: “A Simple Desultory Philippic (or How I was Robert 
McNamara’d Into Submission),” 47 DUKE L.J. 491, 516 (1997) (noting that judges rely on 
defendant demeanor to assess sincerity of remorse in sentencing); cf. ROBERT H. FRANK, 
PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 125–31 (1988) (discussing 
interpretational clues to sincerity of emotional expression). 
 52. Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of 
the Actor’s Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 353–55 (1989). 
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sincerity of conduct.53 The idea is that we reap greater benefits by 
associating with people who do the right thing because of a strong 
emotional commitment to do good for its own sake than we do from 
associating with those who do the right thing only because it benefits 
them in some way. Frank forcefully argues that the nuances of 
behavior represent subconscious clues to an individual’s emotional 
commitments;54 in short, although imperfect, they help us sort Hawks 
from Doves. Those cues can be particularly important once a person 
has acted in a Hawkish manner. 
Thus, a person who apologizes primarily out of emotional need 
is likely to fare better than a person who apologizes purely for 
strategic reasons. The key to that success, however, lies precisely in 
the fact that the former person is not acting in order to obtain the 
gain.  
What about forgivers? Are people who forgive out of an 
emotional need or sense of religious or social obligation made better off 
than those who forgive purely as a consequence of rational 
calculation? Recall that Axelrod attributed the success of the tit-for-tat 
strategy to a combination of its retaliation and its generous 
forgiveness.55 In the more nuanced environment of human interaction, 
the most successful forgiving strategy might be generous but 
discerning. If the cues indicate that an apology is sincere and the 
transgressor is committed to future cooperation, then the victim who 
is able to forgive generously might well reap more benefits from future 
interaction than one who forgives less generously. An emotional 
commitment to forgive in the face of a heartfelt apology might thus be 
beneficial. On the other hand, effective scrutiny of the apology might 
well require any number of rational calculations, including a 
calculation of the value of the relationship to each party. Moreover, 
strong contradictory emotions can be at play for victims contemplating 
postconflict resolution. The victim’s anger can dissipate in the face of a 
heartfelt apology, seemingly out of her own control. But at times the 
results are not so cathartic; some victims dismiss apologies and hold 
onto grudges out of an emotional commitment to spite or revenge. 
Thus, emotional commitments toward generous forgiveness are less 
clearly valuable; nevertheless, many people respond emotionally to 
apologies that appear sincere, and where those emotions are at work, 
the individuals feel favorably disposed to reconcile conflict. 
 
 53. FRANK, supra note 51, at 125–31. 
 54. Id. at 53–54. 
 55. Supra Part II.A. 
         
2011] ORGANIZATIONAL APOLOGIES 1971 
C. Ingroup vs. Outgroup Differences 
Although apology can play a powerful role in reconciling 
conflict, apologetic behaviors and their results are hardly uniform. 
Tendencies to apologize and to forgive likely are dependent on a 
number of factors, including personality,56 culture,57 and sex.58 In 
addition, and more relevant to the present topic, reconciliation 
behaviors are also highly dependent on the nature of the relationship 
between the transgressor and the victim. Consider hierarchy, for 
example. De Waal indicates that in highly hierarchical primate 
groups, dominants initiate reconciliation efforts far less often than in 
more egalitarian primate species.59 Subordinates might well have 
more need to restore a relationship. One might therefore expect that 
in human societies and organizations, subordinates will apologize to 
superiors more frequently than superiors will apologize to 
subordinates.60 On the other hand, apology rituals appear to be more 
common in hierarchical settings than in egalitarian settings.61 It may 
 
 56. See Deborah Levi, Why Not Just Apologize? How To Say You’re Sorry, in ADR, 18 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 147, 165 (2000) (noting that involved 
individuals’ personalities might be inconsistent with effective apology); see also Brent T. White, 
Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 
1289 (2006) (noting that the effects of forced apology might depend on the personality of the 
transgressor). 
 57. Hickson, supra note 25, at 283. Some, for example, note a greater inclination on the part 
of the Japanese to apologize compared to the people of Western nations. Wagatsuma & Rosett, 
supra note 25, at 461; see also Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean 
Dispute Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1–2 
(2005). Others have drawn a distinction between “shame” and “guilt” cultures. Michael C. 
Luebbert, The Survival Value of Forgiveness, in EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE, supra note 25, at 
169, 178–89. But see TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 37–44 (questioning validity of guilt/shame 
distinction for understanding apologies). Still others have noted probable differences in 
collectivist and individualist countries in their propensity to apologize for the transgressions of 
others. Triandis, supra note 25, at 35, 39. 
 58. Some studies find sex differences in willingness to apologize for small transgressions. 
See, e.g., Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One Aspect of Communicative 
Competence, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 194, 197 (1989) (analyzing a New Zealand study showing 
differences between the apology rates of male and female students). Others have not found sex 
differences in willingness to apologize. Bruce Fraser, On Apologizing, in CONVERSATIONAL 
ROUTINE: EXPLORATIONS IN STANDARDIZED COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS AND PREPATTERNED 
SPEECH 259, 269 (Flourian Coulmas ed., 1981). Regarding small transgressions, one study found 
that men are more likely to apologize for intrusions on time while women are more likely to 
apologize for intrusions on space. Judith Mattson Bean & Barbara Johnstone, Workplace 
Reasons for Saying You’re Sorry: Discourse Task Management and Apology, 17 DISCOURSE 
PROCESSES 59, 79 (Roy O. Freedle ed., 1994). 
 59. DE WAAL, supra note 24, at 44, 163–65, 220 (discussing practices among stumptail 
monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos). 
 60. O’Hara, supra note 16, at 1076. 
 61. Hickson, supra note 25, at 285–87. 
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be that apologies help to reinforce the hierarchy: subordinate apology 
could serve to restore the dominant’s favor,62 whereas dominants may 
proffer apology in lieu of tangible compensation.63 These speculations 
need further exploration in the literature. Note, however, that the 
dynamics of hierarchy occur within the context of a given social group. 
As implied by the discussion of subordinate apology, the 
importance of the relationship to each of the parties also appears to 
influence reconciliation behaviors.64 We can all think of situations 
where we have felt a sense of relief when a loved one apologizes for 
poor behavior. The subjective costs of continuing these conflicts and 
losing the benefits of a close relationship are no doubt larger than in 
cases where conflict arises with casual acquaintances or strangers. 
Taken to its extreme, this inclination to reconcile can prove harmful to 
the victim. For example, there is some indication that victims of 
domestic violence often are overinclined to forgive their batterers 
because they frequently see themselves as having no viable options 
outside the relationship.65 In these situations, the victim may be so 
desperate to continue the relationship that she ignores indications 
that the batterer’s promise to forbear future transgressions is not 
credible. At the other end of the spectrum, we may be much more 
cynical about apologies offered as public gestures by individuals whom 
we do not personally know and whom we do not need for security, 
prosperity, or happiness. 
Victim willingness to reconcile with a transgressor likely also 
depends on the extent to which the victim perceives the transgressor 
to be a member of the victim’s ingroup. De Waal’s primate 
reconciliation studies, for example, all involve conflicts within a 
primate group that lives together. All of his examples of reconciliation 
involve continuing relationships of mutual support, and studies of 
primates outside of a single captive colony are very rare. The ingroup 
hypothesis, however, has some support in the available literature. In a 
study of primate reconciliation within a single colony of long-tail 
 
 62. Cf. Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis Into Evidence 
Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 252 (1999) (“Dominance 
feminism would recognize that apologies may be a style of coping for subordinate groups—
weaker groups who are acculturated to apologize, to curry favor, to ensure safety, and to 
reinforce the hierarchy.”). 
 63. O’Hara, supra note 16, at 1077. 
 64. See, e.g., Joan B. Silk, The Form and Function of Reconciliation in Primates, 31 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 21, 37 (2002) (noting that in disputing adult humans, “relationships that 
have important economic, social or political utility are more likely to be resolved”). 
 65. Cf. O’Hara, supra note 16, at 1073–74 & n.74 (noting that more than forty percent of 
women utilizing domestic violence shelters return to their batterers and citing studies indicating 
that victims are more likely to return when they do not perceive decent alternatives). 
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macaques, researchers found that reconciliation tendencies were 
higher between macaques that needed one another’s cooperation to 
obtain a desirable food than they were between other macaques within 
the colony.66 
Recently, a study of rhesus monkeys living on an uninhabited 
island southeast of Puerto Rico showed possible evidence that the 
monkeys had developed biases in favor of ingroup and against 
outgroup members.67 Rhesus monkeys live in tight-knit social groups. 
Subjects were presented with pictures of other rhesus monkeys who 
were from either within or outside of the subject’s group. The subject 
monkeys stared at pictures of outgroup members for a longer period of 
time than they stared at pictures of group members. This difference 
persisted even when the monkey was familiar with the outgroup 
monkey represented in the picture. In addition, when the researchers 
paired the group member’s picture with pictures of either good (fruit) 
or bad (spiders) objects, subjects stared longer at the group 
member/bad object pairing. Conversely, when the subject was 
presented with an outgroup rhesus monkey picture paired with 
pictures of either good or bad objects, it stared longer at the outgroup 
member/good object pairings. Researchers believe that the subject’s 
length of attention indicates its views on whether the pairing is 
natural or consistent; according to this theory, incongruent pairings 
result in greater attention paid by the subject. These results mirror 
studies of humans that attempt to ascertain implicit attitudes; there, 
too, researchers believe that longer response times indicate a 
subconscious determination that the pairings are incongruent. 
Human societies are much more fluid and dynamic than those 
of other primates. We affiliate with large numbers of groups over the 
course of our lifetimes for different purposes, and we identify with 
others along a large number of dimensions, including nationality, 
ethnicity, religious affiliation, neighborhood of residence, place of 
employment, shared professional training, hobbies, and personality 
traits. As a matter of practical reality, then, the notion of ingroup and 
outgroup is neither as dichotomous nor as fixed a concept for humans 
as it may be for other primates. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that 
a person’s sense of another as a member of an ingroup or outgroup can 
be stronger or weaker depending on a number of factors that 
contribute to this sense of strength. Perhaps the strength of 
 
 66. Marina Cords & Sylvie Thurnheer, Reconciling with Valuable Partners by Long-tailed 
Macaques, 93 ETHOLOGY 315, 315 (1993). 
 67. Neha Mahajan et al., The Evolution of Intergroup Bias: Perceptions and Attitudes in 
Rhesus Macaques, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 387, 387 (2011). 
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ingroup/outgroup attitudes could serve as a rough proxy for the 
subjective value of a relationship. If so, then all else being equal, the 
more clearly the transgressor appears to be a member of the outgroup 
in the eyes of the victim, the less likely it is that the victim will be 
willing to reconcile when confronted with the same conciliatory 
gestures. Conversely, the stronger the victim’s perception that the 
transgressor is a member of the ingroup, the more likely it is that the 
victim would be willing to reconcile. 
Even if group attitudes are more variable for humans, the 
phenomenon of categorizing others as members of an ingroup or 
outgroup is apparently every bit as automatic and as dichotomous for 
humans as it is for other primates. Very subtle experimental 
measures can trigger the categorization of others as part of an ingroup 
or an outgroup. For example, the simple use of inclusive pronouns, 
such as we, us, and our, versus exclusive pronouns, such as they, 
them, and their, causes subjects to place others in the categories 
suggested by the pronouns used.68 Indeed, when the word “we” was 
paired with nonsense syllables (e.g., “xeh”), subjects rated the 
nonsense syllables significantly more positively than subjects who 
viewed the nonsense syllable paired with an unrelated control word.69 
The fact that biases associated with ingroups appeared in this study, 
where no social connections are present, illustrates both their strength 
and their innateness. Furthermore, in the context of implicit attitude 
testing, subjects who were presented with ingroup pronouns 
responded more quickly to positive traits, which were later presented 
on a computer screen, than subjects who were not presented with the 
ingroup pronouns.70 
In another experiment, subjects were told that they would be 
working with two other individuals to complete a task; they were then 
asked to read a script into the microphone to help give directions to 
the others about the task. Some subjects were given a script that used 
the words “we” and “our” (e.g., “we have been asked to . . . ,” “our task 
is to . . .”), while others were given scripts that did not use these 
ingroup pronouns. After reading the script, the subjects were asked to 
rate both their expectations about the other two individuals and their 
expectations about whether the subject expected the group to work as 
one team or as separate individuals. Subjects who were presented 
with the ingroup pronouns rated the other group members more 
 
 68. SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON 
INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 104 (2000). 
 69. Id. at 106. 
 70. Id. at 107–08. 
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highly and were more likely to express a belief that the group would 
work together as a single team.71 In all of these experiments, subjects 
indicated a significant bias toward members of their perceived 
ingroup, and researchers could easily prime these perceptions. 
Negative biases and hostile attitudes toward members of 
outgroups also are well documented. Many species of animals will 
behave violently to the introduction of a new member of the species. 
After describing multiple studies, for example, one scholar observed 
that “[p]rimate social units appear, in general, to be intolerant of close 
proximity to extra-group [members of the same species].”72 Even 
within a social unit, it is common for group members to target, attack, 
or at least ostracize other members of the unit who appear to be 
deviant due to illness, incapacity, or other external differences.73 Some 
scholars suggest that this casting of the deviant into the outgroup 
category occurs because the ingroup perceives the deviant as a threat 
to group norms, beliefs, and behaviors.74 
Researchers observed this phenomenon in a number of species, 
including humans.75 For humans, outgroup biases often take the form 
of a generalized distrust of strangers. More generally, studies indicate 
that humans ascribe more positive attributes to ingroup members and 
more negative attributes to outgroup members. Basically, we are more 
inclined to interpret the behavior and motives of ingroup members 
favorably than we are to grant the same benefit of the doubt to 
outgroup members. We are also more likely to anticipate cooperation 
from ingroup members than from outgroup members.76 And, when in a 
competitive environment, the negative stereotyping of outgroup 
members becomes much more prevalent.77 
These negative biases are “open to considerable cultural 
manipulation”78 though, allowing negative reactions toward outgroup 
members to be mitigated in a number of ways. In general, 
mechanisms that cause individuals to focus on similarities and 
 
 71. Id. at 111–12. 
 72. Johan M.G. van der Dennen, Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation. A 
Review and Interpretation of the Literature, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM: 
EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM AND NATIONALISM 1, 21 
(Vernon Reynolds et al. eds., 1987). 
 73. Id. at 23–24. 
 74. Id. at 28. 
 75. See id. at 21–28. 
 76. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 139 (1991). 
 77. Jay W. Jackson, Realistic Group Conflict Theory: A Review and Evaluation of the 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 43 PSYCHOL. REC. 395 (1993). 
 78. Robin I.M. Dunbar, Sociobiological Explanations and the Evolution of Ethnocentrism, in 
THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM, supra note 72, at 56. 
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compatibilities rather than on differences can influence 
ingroup/outgroup perceptions. In addition, outgroup perceptions can 
be mitigated by placing the two groups into a superordinate group in 
which members of the subgroup carry a positive affiliation (i.e., 
despite our differences, we are all Americans, Christians, etc.).79 And 
outgroup biases can be mitigated by placing individuals in a 
cooperative rather than a competitive environment.80 These strategies 
likely help to increase the perception that the outgroup member(s) 
share similar norms, beliefs, and behaviors with ingroup members. 
The dispute resolution literature has begun to incorporate 
some very basic insights from the ingroup/outgroup literature. For 
example, Jennifer Gerarda Brown notes that people with different 
backgrounds and cultures will communicate with different styles and 
emphases and that these differences can work to create unfair biases 
in VOM participation.81 International relations and conflict resolution 
scholars have noted the special challenges that outgroup biases create 
for attempting to reconcile ethnic and other intergroup conflicts.82 To 
date, however, the effects of ingroup/outgroup association on the 
efficacy of reconciliation have not received sustained discussion. As 
will become more apparent in Part III, one of the lessons from the PR 
following the BP oil spill is that the topic deserves more serious 
attention. 
In the meantime, here are some hypotheses about how 
ingroup/outgroup biases influence reconciliation efforts through 
apology. The presence of ingroup/outgroup biases suggests that 
reconciliation efforts will be more difficult when the victim perceives 
the transgressor to be a member of an outgroup. By definition, 
outgroup members provide smaller relational benefits than ingroup 
members, so there is less benefit to reconciling with them, all else 
equal. Moreover, the ingroup/outgroup literature suggests that a 
victim is less likely to ascribe a positive motivation to an apology from 
an outgroup transgressor, and she is less likely to forecast that the 
transgressor will engage in cooperative behaviors in the future. In 
some cases, the very fact of the transgression is likely to cause a 
victim to place the transgressor into the outgroup category reserved 
 
 79. See GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 68, at 83, 124. 
 80. See id. at 120. 
 81. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural 
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1286 (1994). 
 82. See, e.g., Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Approach to 
Understanding Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2009). See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGINGS: 
JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993). 
         
2011] ORGANIZATIONAL APOLOGIES 1977 
for deviants. If the transgressor belongs to a different class or national 
or racial group, then these additional “otherness” features can further 
hinder productive reconciliation. 
D. Organizational Apology 
Although organizations are nonhuman, their activities can 
harm and offend others. Through their agents and employees, 
corporations and other organizations can cause accidents, design and 
distribute harmful products and services, engage in scandalous or 
illegal behavior, and violate norms of social responsibility.83 When 
third parties are harmed by these activities, apologies can help victims 
heal while reducing the potential liabilities of the organization. 
Apologies can also help redeem the organization’s reputation. 
There is ample evidence that organizations can use apologies to 
produce some of the same benefits that individual transgressors 
produce when they apologize. Consider, for example, the disclosure 
and apology policies recently adopted by some U.S. hospitals. During 
the 1990s, the Veterans’ Affairs (“VA”) hospital in Lexington, 
Kentucky, embarked upon a novel experiment.84 It adopted a policy to 
disclose any known medical error to the patient harmed by that error, 
to offer corrective medical treatment or compensation to the patient, 
and to deliver an apology to the patient.85 During the first seven-year 
period after implementation of this new policy, the hospital 
experienced a larger number of patient claims but significantly 
reduced liability costs.86 Some people were reasonably skeptical of the 
generalizability of these results because VA hospitals are unlikely to 
face the same potential liabilities as other hospitals. For example, VA 
hospitals are different from private hospitals in several ways: they are 
not subject to punitive damages, their public-sector nature reduces 
their exposure to liability, and their patients, as veterans, have 
additional sources of compensation.87 Because of these factors, VA 
hospital patients have less to lose by settling with an apology and 
modest compensation than civilian patients who suffer from medical 
 
 83. See KEITH MICHAEL HEARIT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY APOLOGY: CORPORATE RESPONSES 
TO ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING 122–23 (2006). 
 84. See Cohen, supra note 42, at 1451. 
 85. Id. at 1451 n.9. 
 86. E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Errors: Pinning the Blame Versus Blaming the System, in 
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 213, 217 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004); 
see also Cohen, supra note 42, at 1457. 
 87. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in 
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1023 (2005). 
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errors in other hospitals. More recently, however, the results have 
been replicated in non-VA hospitals. For example, a similar policy 
implemented by the University of Michigan Health System produced a 
cut in medical malpractice suits by more than fifty percent.88 Other 
hospitals have recently implemented similar policies.89 The results 
suggest that patients respond favorably to apologies offered on behalf 
of institutions. 
There is also some evidence that apology works to resurrect an 
organization in the eyes of third-party observers. Reputation 
influences the welfare of an organization as much as it influences 
individuals.90 An organization’s ability to recruit active members, 
employees, customers, and other business opportunities will be 
furthered by a positive reputation and hampered by a negative one.91 
Studies also indicate that organizations can bolster their reputations 
with effective apologies. For example, in a study involving 264 
university students, subjects were given a vignette describing a 
property management company that both refused to return renter 
deposits to college-student tenants and refused to provide receipts for 
claimed repairs. Some subjects were told that the owner of the 
company had accepted full responsibility for its acts. Some were told 
that the owner regretted the company’s actions. Some were told both. 
And some were given no information regarding the owner’s 
responsibility or regret. Both the company’s regret and recognition of 
responsibility positively affected subjects’ reputation scores for the 
company. Additionally, the presence of these factors reduced the 
reported anger that subjects felt toward the company. On the other 
hand, apology statements that didn’t contain these elements failed to 
resurrect the company in subjects’ ratings.92 
 
 88. Boothman et al., supra note 42, at 147. 
 89. See Carol Bayley, Medical Mistakes and Institutional Culture, in ACCOUNTABILITY, 
supra note 86, at 99, 102–05 (discussing similar disclosure policy adopted by Catholic Healthcare 
West system). 
 90. William M. Sage stated: 
[R]eputation not only accrues to better-performing companies, but also enables their 
performance. A good reputation attracts corporate partners, sponsors and employees in 
addition to customers, and reassures government regulators. In repeated transactions, 
reputation serves to enforce contracts without recourse to law. The premium paid by 
acquirers for goodwill also provides incentive for each successive owner to invest money 
and effort to preserve a firm’s established reputation. 
William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY, 
supra note 86, at 159, 180 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Kristin M. Pace et al., The Acceptance of Responsibility and Expressions of Regret in 
Organizational Apologies After a Transgression, 15 CORP. COMM. INT’L J. 410, 420–22 (2010). 
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Given that basic rules of apology apply to organizations when 
they commit wrongdoing, companies should focus on the delivery of 
effective apology when appropriate. But organizations, especially 
corporations and other for-profit entities, may be disadvantaged 
relative to individuals in their ability to reconcile through apology. 
Although the above studies indicate that victims and third parties 
respond in similar ways to apologies proffered by organizations, we do 
not know whether organizational apologies are as effective as 
individual apologies. And there is some reason to surmise that, all else 
being equal, the organizational apology will be less effective than an 
apology from an individual transgressor. First, apologies work for 
individuals in part because the strong emotional attachment that we 
have to our personal relationships causes us to value reconciliation; by 
contrast, the organization does not itself have emotions and is 
therefore not part of the very close personal relationships that we 
enjoy. Thus, we can expect the victim and others to have relatively 
less emotional dependence on the organization, and this lower 
dependence could make individuals less receptive to an organization’s 
apology.93 Second, for-profit organizations exist to generate profits, 
which enhances the likelihood that people scrutinizing their behaviors 
will attribute those behaviors to rational calculations. Also, because 
the main purpose of those organizations is to generate profits, victims 
and third parties are likely more inclined to think that they should 
remedy their wrongs through the payment of money. Thus, the 
reduced liabilities from apologies, although present, may be smaller 
for for-profit organizations. 
However, organizations have one powerful advantage over 
individuals in the delivery of apology. Because organizations consist of 
multiple individuals, individuals within the organization who 
contribute to a transgression need not be the same individuals who 
specialize in the delivery of apologies. When a doctor screws up in the 
operating room, he has only his own personality, haughty or genuine, 
with which to attempt to convey a transgressor’s apology. Of course, 
the doctor can hire a PR person, but then he looks like he is hiding 
behind another, and the apology is less likely to be effective.94 In 
contrast, people view an organization as a single entity even though 
multiple individuals conduct its activities. When the hospital makes 
an error, it doesn’t matter if it is run by one hundred Hawks who 
 
 93. Given the lack of emotional dependence on them, it might be easier for people to cast 
organizations into the outgroup category.  
 94. Cf. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 23 (“There is, quite simply, nothing as effective and 
unsettling as having to address in person someone we have wronged.”). 
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control the organization’s policies; so long as it keeps a few (perhaps 
even one) sweetheart Dove(s) around to manage the PR, it can reap all 
the available benefits of apology.95 When the spokesperson of an 
organization speaks on behalf of the organization, she is the 
organization for purposes of public perception. All of the attitudes and 
attributes that the spokesperson elicits can affect others’ perceptions 
of the organization itself. If the hypotheses presented above about 
ingroup and outgroup effects on apology are correct, then a large 
organization can house several Doves, each of whom can elicit ingroup 
attitudes in some targeted portion of the population. Put differently, it 
is possible for organizations to exploit our human propensity to forgive 
following a heartfelt apology. On the other hand, if the company 
spokesperson commits a PR blunder or evokes outgroup hostilities, 
then the whole organization can feel the negative effects. 
III. CORPORATE APOLOGY: LESSONS FROM THE BP OIL SPILL 
When businesses are accused of causing harms or committing 
wrongs, sometimes the best possible PR strategy is for corporate 
leaders to admit fault, apologize for any harm caused, and offer to do 
what they can to fix or at least ameliorate the damage. But corporate 
leaders are not always so wise. Sometimes they lack clear evidence of 
fault or wish to avoid having to accept blame. At other times, they 
accept blame but their expressions of remorse fall flat. It seems that 
corporate apology has evolved through a series of blunders made by 
corporate leaders providing lessons for future leaders to absorb. This 
part describes both the lessons that BP learned from Exxon’s handling 
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the lessons that future corporate 
leaders can learn from BP’s mishandling of PR after the Macondo oil 
spill. 
A. Exxon After the Exxon Valdez Accident 
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground in Prince 
William Sound in Alaska and spilled more than eleven million gallons 
of crude oil into the sea.96 Damage from the spill represented the worst 
 
 95. For some wrongs, a high-level management person, such as the CEO, Chairman of the 
Board, Regional President, or the like, will need to handle the initial PR. That person will do 
better with Dove-like tendencies, but the point is the organization may be able to call on a 
number of managers and then turn over the PR task to an even more skilled individual with 
lesser authority within the organization. 
 96. For the Environmental Protection Agency’s description of the event and remediation 
efforts by the U.S. government, see Exxon Valdez, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ 
learning/exxon.htm (last visited June 15, 2011). 
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environmental disaster in U.S. history to that point,97 including the 
pollution of more than a thousand miles of shoreline, the death of tens 
of thousands of animals, and the temporary destruction of the 
livelihoods of thousands of fishermen.98 According to some accounts, 
the captain of the ship was a heavy drinker who consumed alcohol 
before boarding the ship and went to sleep after turning over the 
ship’s navigation to an uncertified third party.99 For six days after the 
spill, the company remained silent until the media-shy CEO Lawrence 
Rawl finally emerged to comment—but not to apologize—on behalf of 
the company.100 Ten days after the accident, Exxon finally ran full-
page ads in 166 newspapers apologizing for the spill.101 Rawl waited 
nearly three weeks to visit the area of the spill.102 In defending his 
own inaction sometime later, Rawl stated that he was busy running 
the company from New York.103 When it was suggested that Exxon—
rather than taxpayers—pay for all of the cleanup costs, one Exxon 
executive said that if the company was forced to do so then it would 
raise gas prices to cover the costs.104 Despite its printed apology and 
the fact that Exxon ultimately took significant responsibility for 
cleanup costs, the company’s reputation suffered for many years.105 
Many consumers refused to purchase from Exxon106 and a jury 
imposed a $5 billion punitive damages fine on the company for 
“reckless” behavior (the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently reduced 
this award to approximately $500 million).107 
There was no doubt that Exxon would suffer some of these 
financial losses in any event simply because one of its ships caused 
 
 97. See id. 
 98. Jennifer Bayot, Lawrence Rawl, 76, Exxon’s Chief in Valdez Spill, Dies, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2005, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/obituaries/16rawl.html. 
 99. See The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster, EXPLORE NORTH, http://explorenorth.com/ 
library/weekly/aa032499.htm (last visited June 15, 2011) (reporting that a jury subsequently 
acquitted the captain of charges that he had operated the tanker while intoxicated). 
 100. See Jennifer Hogue, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, AVOIDING DISASTER: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF HAVING A CRISIS PLAN, http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/spring01/hogue/exxon.html (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2011). 
 101. Stuart Elliott, Exxon’s Image Soiled; Public Angry at Slow Action on Oil Spill, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 21, 1989, at 1B. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Richard Behar, Interview with Lawrence Rawl: Exxon Strikes Back, TIME, Mar. 26, 
1990, at 62–63, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969673,00.html. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Cf. Anne C. Mulkern, BP's PR Blunders Mirror Exxon's, Appear Destined for Record 
Book, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/10/10greenwire-bps-pr-
blunders-mirror-exxons-appear-destined-98819.html (stating that although Exxon survived and 
is profitable, “its reputation and its image will be forever linked to the Valdez oil spill”).  
 106. Hogue, supra note 100. 
 107. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481, 515 (2008). 
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injury to the environment and to the Alaskan fishing and tourist 
industries. But a botched PR response surely cost it much more than 
necessary in company profits. These losses could have been avoided 
with a more careful handling of the situation. The public doubted the 
sincerity of the company’s apology, which in turn caused doubts about 
the extent to which Exxon would forgo short-term profits in order to 
promote safety and environmentally sound practices. 
Exxon’s face-saving gestures appeared insincere in several 
ways. First, the delay in providing an initial public statement 
suggested that the company was avoiding acceptance of responsibility, 
failing to take the severity of the harm caused by the accident 
seriously, or both. Second, the company delivered its first apology 
more than ten days after the accident and used the passive medium of 
a print advertisement. Written apologies are often less effective than 
oral apologies because they are more difficult to scrutinize for 
sincerity. Additionally, written apologies can create the impression 
that the transgressor is avoiding full ownership of the wrong. And 
advertisements, as venues for earning profits, are probably 
particularly suspect vehicles through which to express responsibility 
and remorse. Third, the statement that the company will raise gas 
prices to pay for the cleanup costs, even if an accurate depiction of 
economic realities, suggests that the company will continue to wield 
its power over its victims even when remediating its wrongs. 
Rawl never really appreciated the company’s errors. A year 
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, he participated in an interview with 
Time magazine in which he both emphasized how harrowing the 
aftermath of the spill had been for him and expressed bitterness at the 
refusal of the American public to accept the company’s apologies.108 
Rawl believed that environmental groups used the company as a 
scapegoat to further their broader regulatory agendas.109 Moreover, he 
minimized the fact that thousands of consumers had cut up their 
Exxon credit cards by arguing that those customers did not purchase 
much from the company anyway.110 
B. BP After the Macondo Well Rupture 
BP’s public statements after the Macondo oil spill suggest that 
company executives learned from Exxon’s behavior. BP’s CEO, Tony 
Hayward, responded immediately and spoke regularly with the 
 
 108. Behar, supra note 103, at 62–63. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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media,111 personally flew over the affected area to view the oil 
leakage,112 visited the oil-stained beaches once the oil washed 
ashore,113 and stated many times publicly that the company would pay 
the full costs of the cleanup.114 The company offered a $20 billion fund 
to help pay for the damage caused to local industries.115 Moreover, 
both Hayward116 and President Obama117 made public statements that 
the company was financially strong and could absorb these costs. 
Their statements suggested both that the company’s promise to pay 
was credible and that BP might successfully avoid raising prices or 
cutting safety corners in the future to recover from these liabilities. 
Hayward delivered his apologies in person, allowing his features to 
indicate a sense of deep remorse: his eyes turned glassy and red, his 
soft facial expressions signaled regret, and his skin tone grew flush.118 
A viewer scrutinizing Hayward’s apology might well conclude that his 
(and therefore BP’s) sense of regret was both sincere and significant 
and that the company was genuinely trying hard to cap the well. 
The apology alone was not sufficient to remove all sense of 
resentment toward BP. Initial estimates that a thousand barrels of 
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crude oil gushed into the ocean per day119 were woefully inaccurate, 
and by August the Environmental Protection Agency estimated that 
sixty times more oil than that was actually gushing from the well.120 
The damage to the ocean and coastal environments seemed likely to be 
massive,121 especially because the company seemed incapable of 
finding a way to cap the spill. But given this dismal situation, 
Hayward’s apology and repeated pledge to pay for the cleanup and 
damage was able to at least convey BP’s incompetence rather than 
indifference or malevolence. Some called for a government takeover of 
the cleanup.122 Some questioned whether BP’s drilling operations 
should be subject to more stringent regulatory oversight.123 But the 
company’s initial PR efforts probably worked to insulate the company 
from the worst consequences of reputation-harming conduct, such as 
future customer boycotts and potential punitive damages liability.124 
BP did not fully internalize the lessons from Exxon’s botched 
Exxon Valdez response, however. Efforts to stop the oil from gushing 
continued to fail, and, despite some evidence that the leaking oil was 
at least partly the fault of Transocean, which owned and operated the 
drilling rig,125 public blame remained focused on BP. Moreover, the 
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continued gushing of oil coupled with the repeated rise in spill 
estimates created a situation where the sense of transgression was 
continually renewed. As a result, the company could not simply 
deliver a few heartfelt apologies and then get to work cleaning up the 
mess. Instead, the situation demanded that BP’s apology discourse 
continue over time. And it required BP to view the situation as a 
growing crisis that demanded the full attention of company leaders. 
Over time, however, Hayward appeared to grow weary of 
handling the crisis. On May 30, 2010, nearly seven weeks after the 
explosion, Hayward delivered a statement of apology to a reporter that 
exuded his fatigue and frustration. In the process, he committed 
Rawl’s blunder of suggesting that other matters might be more 
important than managing the crisis. Hayward stated: “We’re sorry. 
We’re sorry for the massive disruption it’s caused to their lives. And 
there’s no one who wants this thing over more than I do. I’d like my 
life back.”126 Hayward apparently made these statements in an effort 
to prove that he would not let the company dither in its efforts to cap 
the spewing oil and clean up the beaches. He might well have thought 
that these statements would bolster a belief that the crisis was his 
number one priority. Unfortunately, the public perceived his words 
very differently. Part of the problem was that when Hayward said 
that he wanted his life back, the tone in his voice oozed frustration 
and irritation. His nonverbalized cues suggested that his personal 
priorities placed other activities over fixing the problem in the Gulf. In 
that moment, Hayward appeared to be disassociating himself from 
BP. He was an employee beleaguered by the actions that had caused 
harm and was tired of having to put so much effort into helping fix a 
problem for which he did not consider himself personally responsible. 
In the eyes of the public, however, Hayward was not separate from 
BP; rather, he was BP. And the public heard his statements of 
personal weariness as company statements about poor priorities in the 
aftermath of disastrous harm. 
The discussion of apology in Part II suggested that effective 
apologies only work when the transgressor places himself in a morally 
inferior position relative to the victim, expresses a willingness to do 
whatever it takes to resurrect himself, and bestows upon the victim 
the power to determine whether forgiveness will be forthcoming. It is 
 
involved”); Transocean Seeks to Limit Liability for Oil Rig Blast, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May, 13, 
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typically counterproductive for a transgressor to say, “I am sorry but 
I’m tired of trying to convince you of that.” Although unintended, this 
is precisely the message that Hayward conveyed. 
The public interpretation of Hayward’s comments were made 
worse by the fact that Hayward, as representative of BP, displayed a 
public persona that caused the viewing public to place BP further 
along the outgroup portion of the ingroup/outgroup spectrum. 
Hayward’s statements and conduct evoked images of a transgressor 
from a different social class and national/ethnic group than both the 
American public and the direct victims of the spill. Regarding class, 
Hayward’s arrival on the beach in expensive business attire while 
expressing frustration over the time commitment associated with 
managing the spill suggested that he was an elite who had much 
better things to do than work for the welfare of the victims of his 
spill.127 Hayward confirmed that sense anew when, three weeks later, 
the public media published photographs showing him with his son at a 
yacht race on the Isle of Wight. 
Hayward’s thick British accent probably exacerbated the 
negative connotations of his resentful statements because it pegged 
him and the company as foreign—non-Americans who might not care 
much about the U.S. coastline. In his late-night television show, David 
Letterman joked about Hayward’s statement that he wanted his life 
back. Letterman commented, “[W]ell, that was a smug, ugly, arrogant 
thing to say. And . . . that British accent makes it sound worse.”128 The 
joke resonated with the audience.129 With their laughter, the audience 
showed that they found Hayward’s comment to be arrogant. When he 
attempted to place himself into a superior rather than an inferior 
position while apologizing in his British accent, it is possible that 
Hayward reminded Americans of their former colonization and 
awakened the long-held belief that the British view themselves as 
socially superior. 
As mentioned earlier, ingroups and outgroups can form along 
many dimensions and researchers can easily manipulate our tendency 
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to dichotomize social situations in this way in experimental settings. 
That said, categorizations based on race, ethnicity, and nationality 
seem to form even more readily than others, which is part of why 
ethnic and international conflicts can be so difficult to resolve 
effectively.130 To some extent, it can be rational for citizens of one 
nation to worry about the handling of a major crisis by a person or 
team of people from another nation. Cultural differences can 
significantly influence organizational management, which in turn can 
influence the management of problems. For example, workers in 
different nations vary dramatically in their tendency to avoid 
uncertainty, the degree to which working styles can be characterized 
as “masculine” or “feminine,” the extent to which viewpoints tend to be 
individualist or collective, the relative acceptance of power and status 
differences, and short-term versus long-term decisional 
perspectives.131 Interestingly, however, studies of these differing 
dimensions place the United States and the United Kingdom fairly 
close to one another along each of these dimensions.132 Therefore, any 
outgroup bias resulting from Hayward’s British accent was likely 
relatively minimal and might have been overcome under other 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it was exacerbated by public statements 
(including those by President Obama) referring to BP as “British 
Petroleum”133 despite the fact that BP dropped that name in favor of 
plain “BP” several years earlier.134 The public perception of BP as a 
British company was likely furthered by the fact that BP’s PR firm 
was British rather than American.135 It is possible the British PR firm 
failed to appreciate fully the subtle nuances that would have been 
necessary to minimize the strength with which Americans categorized 
the firm as “outgroup.” And the perception of BP as outgroup led the 
American public to question its commitment to expend the resources 
necessary to fix the problem. 
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Company spokesman blunders were not limited to Hayward, 
however. On June 16, 2010, BP company officials met with President 
Obama at the White House where BP agreed to set up the $20 billion 
compensation fund to help ameliorate the ecological and economic 
losses along the Gulf Coast.136 Although Hayward was present at this 
meeting, he took a back seat to BP’s chairman of the board, Carl-
Henric Svanberg,137 perhaps as a result of his PR troubles. President 
Obama held a press conference announcing the fund, and he spoke 
about the need to help the small business owners, fishermen, and 
shrimpers who had been affected by the spill.138 Thereafter, Svanberg 
stepped up to a microphone outside of the White House to deliver his 
own statements to the press. In addition to setting up the fund, the 
company decided to suspend its quarterly dividend payments to make 
sure that there were sufficient corporate funds to pay for the harm 
caused by the oil spill. The two announcements should have made for 
a very successful PR day for BP, but instead Svanberg’s press 
statements caused further trouble. Svanberg attempted to assure the 
American people that the company appreciated and would respond to 
the plight of those whose livelihood had been harmed, and he 
attempted to express an appreciation for President Obama’s concern 
for the people along the Gulf Coast who had been put out of work. He 
failed. With his thick Swedish accent, Svanberg said, “We care about 
the small people. I hear comments sometimes that large oil companies 
are greedy or don’t care. But that is not the case at BP. We care about 
the small people.”139 
The American public misunderstood Svanberg’s comments. 
Svanberg later attempted to apologize, emphasizing the fact that 
English was not his native language and that his good intentions were 
lost in translation,140 but the damage was already done. Like 
Hayward, Svanberg made statements that the public heard as 
separating out BP and its representatives from its victims along 
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socioeconomic-class lines.141 His accent further reminded the 
American public that BP was a foreign company. BP’s public 
announcement of the compensation fund and the suspension of 
dividend payments worked to raise the trading price of the company’s 
stock shares,142 but it is possible that the demands of those injured 
along the coast grew as a result of these comments. 
It seems that BP eventually recognized that it needed a public 
face with whom Americans could identify. On June 16, 2010, nearly 
two months after the Macondo well explosion, BP announced that 
Managing Director Robert Dudley, an American, would take over the 
company’s response to the crisis.143 BP also ran several television ads 
with company spokespeople who stated that they grew up along the 
Gulf Coast and considered the affected waters and beaches to be their 
home.144 Each gave their pledge that BP would not rest until it undid 
the harm. Hayward gave the same pledges months earlier, but 
somehow these casually dressed, down-to-earth, local American 
citizens were able to deliver that message much more credibly.145 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As of December 31, 2010, BP was conducting operations in 29 
countries, marketing its products in more than 70 countries, and 
employing 79,700 workers.146 With those numbers, it could surely 
target employees to deliver effective apologies and to handle the 
company’s PR. What BP missed was an understanding about how 
those speaking for them can give off subtle messages that solidify (or 
break down) the sense that the company belongs in the outgroup for 
victims and the public generally. Perhaps BP missed the fact that, 
although it is a global corporation that has successfully broken 
through national barriers, deep in our human brains lies a capability 
 
 141. See Clarence Page, Big Oil, ‘Small People,’ CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2010, at 21, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-20/news/ct-oped-0620page-20100620_1_big-oil-gulf-of-
mexico-oil-small-people. 
 142. See Jill Schlesinger, Pre-Market Glimpse: BP Takes Center Stage, CBS NEWS, June 17, 
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-20008002-503983.html?tag=contentMain 
;contentBody. 
 143. See Gomstyn, supra note 137. 
 144. See, for example, BP Oil Spill—Official BP Response Video for Oil Spill Claims, 
YOUTUBE (June 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7w8Aw5Byis8, for a video of one 
such commercial. 
 145. The fact that the U.S. Coast Guard played such an active role likely helped to allay 
concerns that the leak would not be stopped and remedied, but it likely did little to restore public 
attitudes toward BP itself. 
 146. Key Facts and Figures, BP.COM, http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do? 
categoryId=9021229&contentId=7039276 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
         
1990 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:6:1959 
for national pride that, if triggered, can generate hostility toward 
those perceived to be from other nations. A highly profitable company 
finds itself on the hook whenever its actions cause damage, regardless 
of fault. Add to this situation a perception of fault and the cost to the 
company grows, both in terms of liability costs and future regulatory 
burdens. But add in botched PR that increase the sense that the 
company belongs to an outgroup relative to those who sit in judgment 
of it, and the liability and future regulatory hurdles likely rise even 
further.147 
With the very rapid rise of international commerce, many 
companies operate across several national borders.148 Moreover, in the 
last few decades the income disparity between corporate executives 
and ordinary citizens has increased.149 When a company is doing well, 
the public loses sight of these differences in favor of superordinate 
goals like prosperity and technological improvements. But when 
disaster strikes, or difficult times place companies and their 
executives in a position of conflict or competition with a nation’s 
citizenry, then the public judges the company’s conduct more severely. 
That severe judgment can cost a company more than necessary in 
terms of liabilities, human capital, and future regulatory burdens. The 
latter can affect all the other companies in the industry because new 
regulations applicable to an entire industry often follow public outrage 
stemming from one company’s disaster. In order to dampen public 
outrage, there may be an industry-wide interest in effective corporate 
apologies. 
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We need to know more about how outgroup biases influence 
receptions to apologies. Remorse is likely a universally expressed 
phenomenon, but what are the subtle differences in how members of 
different groups display cues to sincerity? How do those differences 
affect the likely success of apologetic gestures? Even if there are no 
systematic differences in expressions of remorse, are victims and other 
audience members simply more skeptical of the sincerity and import 
of such gestures? And, if so, can exaggerated or otherwise altered 
apology efforts mollify those concerns? BP’s handling of the Macondo 
oil spill suggests that these are important questions deserving of 
further exploration. 
 
